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NOTE

RISK AND REPUTATION
Taylor J. Wilson*
Direct listing is an innovative alternative to a traditional initial public offering. Since direct listing was revived in 2018, there have been many lingering
questions, particularly about the liability of financial advisors involved in the
process. In a traditional IPO, a company retains an investment bank as an
underwriter; the underwriter takes on a degree of financial risk and lends credibility to the company’s offering, often directly marketing the offering to potential investors. In a direct listing, however, investment banks act as financial
advisors but do not assume financial risk or market the sale of securities. Section 11 is an important antifraud provision of the Securities Act of 1933, which
imposes liability on all offering participants meeting the statutory definition of
underwriter. Whether that definition fairly encompasses financial advisors is
unsettled, resulting in uncertainty for both investors and offering participants.
After arguing for the application of the Lehman Brothers interpretation of the
underwriter definition, this Note then argues that financial advisors are not
likely to be statutory underwriters under that interpretation. This Note therefore recommends against the application of section 11 liability to financial advisors. After briefly discussing the risks this conclusion implies for investors,
this Note discusses what should be done. One scholar has suggested that section
11 liability should be imposed on financial advisors through exchange rules.
But increasing liability is not without costs. Reframing the question as a choice
between negligence-based liability and scienter-based liability, this Note points
to the possibility that an increase in liability could undermine the primary
benefits of direct listing. Drawing on a framework developed by Professor Assaf
Hamdani, this Note finally discusses the possibility of using direct regulation
in concert with scienter-based liability to incentivize financial advisors to be
effective gatekeepers.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2023, University of Michigan Law School. Thank you to Professor Adam Pritchard for his guidance and feedback throughout the writing process and to Professor Nico Howson for his support and encouragement. I am incredibly grateful for the work
of the Michigan Law Review Volume 121 editors, in particular the support of the Notes Office
and Annie Schuver. Thanks also to Hye-Jin Kim of Volume 120 for valuable feedback throughout the writing process. Thanks to my son Lewis, for giving me many breaks to play with trains
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the securities market has experienced significant innovation. Some of these innovations are geared toward investors, like the development of the trading app Robinhood, which has increased access to the market
for retail investors. Others are geared toward companies, like the recent explosion in the use of special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs). 1 But
with innovation comes unforeseen challenges, and the regulatory apparatus

1. Elliot Bentley, The SPAC Boom, Visualized, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2021, 4:12 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-spac-boom-visualized-in-one-chart-11612962000 [perma.cc/
RPP5-BQXK].
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constantly works to balance the interests of investors with those of honest
businesses. 2
The stock market has seen an increase in the popularity of alternatives to
the traditional initial public offering (IPO). 3 The “SPAC boom” that overtook
the market in 2020 reflects the growing popularity of one alternative. 4 The
lesser-known direct listing is another innovative way to take a company public. 5 In a direct listing, rather than issuing new shares, companies simply list
shares that are held by insiders and employees, allowing them to liquidate
their holdings while taking the company public. 6 Although there were hundreds of SPAC IPOs in 2020 alone, 7 there have been only a dozen direct listings since the method was revived in 2018. 8 But despite being few in number,
many of the companies that chose direct listing were large and recognizable:
Spotify, Coinbase, and Warby Parker, to name a few. 9
One of the key differences between a direct listing and an IPO is the absence of an underwriter. 10 Underwriters are investment banks that play a major role in traditional public offerings, providing several services to the issuer
and fraud protection to the public. 11 For all their import, underwriters are notably absent from direct listings, but investment banks are not. Rather than
acting as underwriters, these banks now play the part of financial advisors. 12
Underwriters traditionally serve a gatekeeping role because they are a
third party that can be held liable for the wrongdoing of the issuer. 13 If there
are material misstatements or omissions in the issuer’s registration statement,
an investor can bring a claim under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933

2. See, e.g., Katanga Johnson, Analysis: Will the Games Stop? SEC Mulls Crackdown on
Trading Apps, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2022, 6:35 AM), https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/willgames-stop-sec-mulls-crackdown-trading-apps-2022-01-26 [perma.cc/PD48-35TV].
3. The Readback, Don’t Call It an IPO, BARRON’S (May 20, 2021, 6:03 PM),
https://www.barrons.com/podcasts/the-readback/dont-call-it-an-ipo/D65EBE64-DFA4-4C3EBB51-1F94A6596315 [perma.cc/B2GK-Q3QF].
4. See Bentley, supra note 1.
5. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Spotify Listing: Can an “Underwriter-less” IPO Attract
Other Unicorns?, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 16, 2018), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2018/01/16/the-spotify-listing-can-an-underwriter-less-ipo-attract-other-unicorns [perma.cc/
T88L-982M].
6. See Alan Jones, Demystifying Direct Listings, PWC (June 9, 2017), https://www.
pwc.com/us/en/services/deals/blog/understanding-direct-listings.html [perma.cc/R3MJ-CMYY].
7. Bentley, supra note 1.
8. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
9. See Taylor Tepper, Warby Parker IPO: What You Need to Know, FORBES ADVISOR
(May 19, 2022, 1:27 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/investing/warby-parker-ipo [perma.
cc/38KS-7YLE].
10. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 5.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION 938 (5th ed. 2019).
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(the “Securities Act”) against both the issuer and the underwriter. 14 Since the
emergence of the direct listing, however, it has been unclear whether a section
11 claim can be brought against an investment bank acting solely as a financial
advisor. 15
Financial advisors could be liable under section 11 if they qualify as “statutory underwriters,” but the scope of that term is unclear. 16 With large tech
companies like Spotify and Slack choosing to use direct listings, large amounts
of investor capital may be implicated in section 11 suits without investors
knowing who to sue. 17 The greater concern is that, in the absence of liability,
financial advisors may not have adequate incentive to serve as effective gatekeepers to the capital market.
But imposing liability to incentivize gatekeeper functions has its own
problems. The direct listing process significantly reduces expenses for issuers,
in turn benefitting investors. 18 These benefits are due in large part to the absence of an underwriter. Increasing liability could undermine these benefits.
This Note claims that financial advisors in direct listings are unlikely to
be liable as underwriters under section 11 of the Securities Act and that the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) should not act to impose liability.
Part I provides an overview of the underwriter’s traditional role in an IPO and
the financial advisor’s role in the direct listing process, drawing particular attention to the distinction between the two activities. Part II examines precedent interpreting section 11’s definition of “underwriter” and argues for the
use of the Second Circuit’s interpretation in Lehman Brothers. Part III applies
that interpretation to financial advisors, arguing that they are not liable as underwriters in direct listing transactions. Part IV examines the risk to investors
and the costs of imposing liability. It raises concern that the cost accompanying increased liability might undermine the benefits of direct listing and instead suggests that the SEC should explore direct regulation.
I.

WHAT IS A DIRECT LISTING?

To understand the role that financial advisors play in direct listings and
their status under section 11, it is necessary to understand the role of underwriters in a traditional IPO. Section I.A of this Note provides an overview of
the underwriters’ role in a typical IPO. Section I.B explains the emergence of
direct listings and contrasts them with the traditional IPO. Section I.C introduces section 11 liability and how it applies to underwriters. Section I.D explains the SEC’s response to the question at issue as well as the scholarly
attention it has received.
14. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k.
15. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 5.
16. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
17. Brent J. Horton, Spotify’s Direct Listing: Is It a Recipe for Gatekeeper Failure?, 72 SMU
L. REV. 177, 210–12 (2019).
18. See generally Cody L. Lipke, Note, Direct Listing: How Spotify Is Streaming on the
NYSE and Why the SEC Should Press Play, 12 J. BUS., ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 149 (2019).
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A. The Role of Underwriters in the IPO Process
When a company chooses to offer shares to the public, it usually engages
one or more investment banks to underwrite the transaction. 19 Investment
banks bring expertise to the IPO process, which assists firms in navigating decisions about corporate structure, securities structure, offering amount, and
price. 20 Typically, a company engages a syndicate of underwriters, with a managing underwriter taking the lead in due diligence, marketing, and price discovery. 21
Underwriters play an important role at every step of the traditional IPO
process. After agreeing to participate in the offering, an underwriter conducts
due diligence for the registration statement. 22 After the registration statement
is filed with the SEC, the underwriter will begin marketing the company. The
centerpiece of this is the “roadshow,” which is a series of marketing presentations given by the issuer in connection with an offering of securities, usually
with the assistance of an underwriter. 23 Often, however, the underwriter will
be in touch with potential investors before the roadshow begins. 24 Throughout this time, the underwriter is also engaged in the book building process. 25
Once the book is built, the underwriter establishes the price based on the information it has acquired and confirms offers from investors at that price. 26
Shares are ultimately allocated to the investors by the managing underwriter. 27
The two most common arrangements by which underwriters facilitate the
sale of securities to the public are firm-commitment underwriting and bestefforts underwriting. 28 In a firm-commitment underwriting arrangement, the
underwriter guarantees the sale of the issuer’s securities by purchasing the securities from the issuer at a discount and then reselling them to the investing
public at a higher price. 29 In addition, the underwriter also frequently agrees

19. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 490.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 493–94. For an in-depth discussion on underwriter syndicates, see Sébastien
Dereeper & Armin Schwienbacher, The Structure and Role of the Underwriting Syndicate, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF IPOS (Douglas Cumming ed., 2019).
22. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 494.
23. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2021) (defining roadshow as “an offer . . . that contains a
presentation regarding an offering by one or more members of the issuer’s management”); ROSS
GEDDES, IPOS AND EQUITY OFFERINGS 154 (2003).
24. GEDDES, supra note 23, at 56–57.
25. In the book building process, “a price range is established and salesmen solicit expressions of interest from investors. There is complete flexibility over the price of the shares and
number to be issued right up until the last moment. Bookbuilding takes place in almost all domestic American and Canadian new issues and the majority of large international offerings.” Id.
at 57.
26. Id. at 58.
27. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 494.
28. Id. at 491.
29. Id. Most IPOs are conducted as firm-commitment offerings. Id. at 493.
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to provide price stabilization, 30 meaning that if the share price drops below
the issue price, the underwriter will purchase securities on the open market to
stabilize that decline. 31 This arrangement benefits the issuer because the underwriter takes on the risk that the securities might not sell.
In a best-efforts underwriting, on the other hand, the issuer bears most of
the financial risk. In this arrangement, the underwriter does not purchase the
securities from the issuer but rather acts as an agent, selling on the issuer’s
behalf. The underwriter receives a commission for each security sold. 32 Although the issuer bears more risk in a best-efforts arrangement, it still benefits
from the legitimacy that the underwriter’s reputation provides. 33
As this description shows, underwriters are intimately involved in the
IPO process. They play an important role in marketing and selling securities
by assuming the risk of loss or renting their reputation to the issuer. Despite
the importance of investment banks in IPOs, most of the functions just described are absent when investment banks act as financial advisors in direct
listings.
B. The Emergence of Direct Listings and Primary Direct Listings
Direct listings are a relatively new way of taking a company public. Unlike
an IPO, the company does not itself issue any securities when it goes public
through a direct listing. Instead, it simply registers securities that are already
held by company insiders (such as employees and early-stage investors) with
the SEC, allowing those insiders to sell their securities. 34
In 2018, the SEC approved a change to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
listing rules, making it significantly easier for companies to use a direct listing. 35 Prior to this change, exchanges such as NYSE and Nasdaq could allow
direct listings at their discretion, but the rules required companies to have a

30.
31.
32.

GEDDES, supra note 23, at 58.
Id.
LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 126 (7th ed. 2018).
33. See GEDDES, supra note 23, at 35 (explaining that the most reputable investment banks
tend to underwrite only less risky IPOs).
34. A Current Guide to Direct Listings, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.gibsondunn.com/a-current-guide-to-direct-listings [perma.cc/XEK6-CSE8] (explaining that, unlike in
IPOs, there is no lock-up period in direct listings).
35. See Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change to Amend Section 102.01B of
the NYSE Listed Company Manual, 83 Fed. Reg. 5650 (Feb. 2, 2018).
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recent trading history in a private placement market, 36 which was used to determine the market value of the shares. 37 Although direct listing was possible
prior to 2018, it was rarely used. 38
After NYSE’s 2018 rule change, companies can use a “shareholder direct
listing” to go public without a sustained history of trading on a private placement market. 39 Nasdaq also implemented substantially similar rule changes in
2019. 40 In 2020, the SEC approved another change to NYSE listing standards,
which allowed companies to go public through a direct listing while also raising fresh capital, creating the “primary direct listing.” 41
Apart from exchange listing requirements, shareholder and primary direct listings differ significantly from traditional IPOs in their structure. Most
important for our discussion is that both types of direct listings are undertaken without the services of a traditional underwriter. Because the company
is not actually issuing any securities, there are no securities for an underwriter
to sell. However, investment banks are not completely absent from the process. NYSE rules governing direct listing transactions mandate valuations

36. A private placement is an unregistered offering of securities, which is typically limited
to accredited investors. Investor Bulletin: Private Placements Under Regulation D, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 24, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_privateplacements.html [perma.cc/359V-3P3S]. A company might not partake in private placements to
avoid public company disclosure requirements. Even if a company has never done a public offering, public company status can be triggered when a company’s investor base reaches a certain
threshold. See Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(1)(A).
37. Proposed Amendment to NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 102.01B, 82 Fed.
Reg. 28200, 28201 (June 15, 2017).
38. Robert Pozen, Shiva Rajgopal & Robert Stoumbos, Opinion: Here’s How a Hot Company Can Go Public Without an IPO, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 7, 2017, 3:27 PM), https://www.
marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-a-hot-company-can-go-public-without-an-ipo-2017-12-07
[perma.cc/J8YV-D5RX]; see also Jones, supra note 6.
39. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., N.Y.S.E. LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, § 102.01B(E) (2021) [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL], https://nyse.wolterskluwer.cloud/listed-companymanual [perma.cc/3X6Z-U6AQ]. Instead, a company can conduct a direct listing if it provides
a valuation evidencing a market value of publicly held shares of at least $250 million. NYSE based
this change on its belief that if a company could meet the $250 million valuation, it would not
likely fail to meet the $100 million requirement upon listing. Proposed Amendment to NYSE
Listed Company Manual Section 102.01B, 82 Fed. Reg. at 28201.
40. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Nasdaq Rule Change for
Direct Listings, 84 Fed. Reg. 5787, 5787–91 (Feb. 15, 2019); Catherine M. Clarkin, Robert W.
Downes & James M. Shea Jr., Updated Nasdaq Requirements for Direct Listings, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/18/updated
-nasdaq-requirements-for-direct-listings [perma.cc/KRK9-DTEC].
41. Order Approving NYSE Proposed Rule Change to Modify Provisions Relating to Direct Listings, 85 Fed. Reg. 54454, 54454–61 (Aug. 26, 2020). Under this new rule allowing primary direct listings, a company can directly list both the shares of its existing shareholders and
its own securities if it will sell at least $100 million in market value of shares in the exchange’s
opening auction on the first day of trading. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 39. If
the company will sell less than $100 million in shares on the opening day, it can still conduct a
primary direct listing if the shares that it lists and the shares that are publicly held immediately
prior to listing have a valuation of $250 million. Id.
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conducted by an “entity that has significant experience and demonstrable
competence in the provision of such valuations.” 42 This refers to investment
banks. 43 Enter the financial advisors.
Companies going public through a direct listing retain investment banks
as financial advisors rather than underwriters. 44 Financial advisors’ involvement in these transactions is more limited than that of traditional underwriters. They advise on the registration statement, assist in the preparation of
“investor education materials” and other public communications, and consult
with the designated market maker who ultimately sets the price. 45
Unlike a traditional IPO, direct listings do not have a book building process, and, so far, companies using direct listings have also opted to skip the
traditional roadshow. 46 Instead, these companies have conducted a single “Investor Day” presentation. 47 Financial advisors do not participate in investor
meetings, but the assistance they provide in preparing investor education materials likely contributes to the Investor Day presentation. 48 Additionally, financial advisors do not provide any price stabilization services to the issuer
following the offering. 49
Since the SEC approved the changes to NYSE rules, shareholder direct
listings and primary direct listings have made up a small portion of the total
number of public offerings. Professor Jay Ritter has identified only thirteen
shareholder direct listings between the 2018 rule change and May 2022:
Spotify, Watford Holdings, Slack, Asana, Palantir Technologies, Thryv Hold-

42. Id.
43. Horton, supra note 17, at 195.
44. Id. at 180; Marc D. Jaffe, Greg Rodgers & Horacio Gutierrez, Spotify Case Study: Structuring and Executing a Direct Listing, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (July 5, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/07/05/spotify-case-study-structuring-and-executing-a-direct-listing [perma.cc/U7FE-DNQ7]. The same investment banks that regularly serve as underwriters in traditional IPOs have served as financial advisors in direct listings. In Spotify’s direct
listing, for example, the financial advisors were Goldman Sachs & Co., Morgan Stanley & Co.,
and Allen & Company. Jaffe et al., supra.
45. Id.; e.g., Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1/A) at 45 (Mar. 23, 2018);
Slack Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 46 (May 31, 2019); Coinbase Glob.,
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 65 (Mar. 23, 2021). See infra Section III.D for a
more detailed explanation of direct listing price discovery.
46. Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. E.g., Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1/A) at 45 (Mar. 23, 2018);
Slack Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 46 (May 31, 2019); Coinbase Glob.,
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) at 65 (Mar. 23, 2021).
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ings, Roblox, Coinbase, ZipRecruiter, Squarespace, Amplitude, Warby Parker, and Bright Green. 50 For comparison, there were about 1,800 IPOs in the
U.S. from 2018 to 2021, 966 of which were SPAC IPOs. 51
Traditional IPOs are a way for a company to get cash. In contrast, in a
shareholder direct listing, the company does not itself sell any shares, so it does
not raise any capital. The company can raise capital if it chooses to undertake
a primary direct listing rather than a shareholder direct listing. But, as of the
writing of this Note, no company has made use of a primary direct listing. So,
what does a company gain from going public through a shareholder direct
listing or a primary direct listing?
First, a direct listing provides liquidity to the issuer’s existing shareholders
by offering them an opportunity to sell. 52 It also has the potential to provide
better returns to selling shareholders, as the price discovery process could decrease underpricing. 53 Compared to an IPO, the price discovery process in a
direct listing is better because a broader range of initial participants are involved. Anyone can place an order through their broker-dealer at whatever
price they think is appropriate, and the orders become part of the initial reference price-setting process. 54 And although there is no initial capital raised
in a shareholder direct listing, it gives the company the option to conduct another offering of securities later on. 55 Most importantly, direct listings are
cheap. Spotify paid around $45 million for its direct listing. 56 If it had done an
IPO, it likely would have paid around $130 million but potentially could have

50. JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: DIRECT LISTINGS THROUGH MAY 19, 2022,
(2022), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/Direct-Listings.pdf [perma.cc/H34Z-NU7M];
Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1) (Mar. 23, 2018); Watford Holdings Ltd.,
Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Mar. 25, 2019); Slack Techs., Inc., Registration Statement
(Form S-1/A) (May 31, 2019); Thryv Holdings, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Sept.
17, 2020); Asana, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Sept. 18, 2020); Palantir Techs.
Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Sept. 21, 2020); Roblox Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Feb. 22, 2021); Coinbase Glob., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1)
(Mar. 23, 2021); ZipRecruiter, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Apr. 23, 2021);
Squarespace, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (May 3, 2021); Amplitude, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Aug. 30, 2021); Warby Parker Inc., Registration Statement (Form
S-1/A) (Sept. 14, 2021); Bright Green Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (May 11,
2022).
51. See SPAC and US IPO Activity, SPAC ANALYTICS, https://www.spacanalytics.com
[perma.cc/4F7G-RU55].
52. A Current Guide to Direct Listings, supra note 34.
53. See id.; see also Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
54. A Current Guide to Direct Listings, supra note 34; Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
55. A company that has already registered an offering with the SEC has the option to
register another offering at a later date using Form S-3. See Adam Hayes, SEC Form S-3,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 2, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/sec-form-s-3.asp [perma.cc/
K3X4-94ZC]. At least one company, Palantir, has taken advantage of the opportunity to conduct
a subsequent offering using Form S-3. See Palantir Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S3) (Oct. 1, 2021).
56. See Horton, supra note 17, at 199–200, 200 chart 4.
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paid up to $300 million. 57 Many of the savings come from the absence of an
underwriter that usually demands a fee of tens of millions of dollars. 58 On the
whole, the direct listing can be an attractive option for companies that do not
have an immediate need for capital and that have a sufficiently prominent
public presence to successfully sell securities without the intensive marketing
of the traditional IPO process.
The requirements and benefits of direct listing allow for inferences about
which companies are likely to use this method. Companies without private
placement trading history can go public using a shareholder direct listing if
they achieve a valuation of $250 million; 59 thus far, these have been companies
with a strong public presence. 60 Additionally, companies using a shareholder
direct listing do not have a need for an immediate cash infusion. This profile
suggests that such companies do not need the intensive marketing services of
an underwriter. 61 Roblox Corporation’s shareholder direct listing serves as an
interesting example of this. Roblox, the owner of the popular online gaming
platform, had planned to conduct a traditional IPO in December of 2020, going so far as to file a registration statement with the SEC. 62 It soon abandoned
that plan, conducted a private fundraising, and—within a few months—went
public through a direct listing instead. 63
C. Section 11 Underwriter Liability
Underwriters are liable for material misstatements and omissions in registration statements filed under the Securities Act. 64 Section 11 of the Securities Act enumerates the parties that are liable for misstatements and omissions
and specifically assigns liability to every underwriter. 65 Section 11 imposes
strict liability on issuers, 66 but for underwriters, section 11 operates more like
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 200.
Id. at 199–200.
NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 39, at 102.01B; NASDAQ, THE NASDAQ
STOCKMARKET RULEBOOK, r. IM-5315-1(b), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/
rules/Nasdaq%205300%20Series [perma.cc/S35Y-Q7YC].
60. See, e.g., Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1/A), at 45 (Mar. 23,
2018); Slack Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 46 (May 31, 2019); Coinbase
Glob., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 65 (Mar. 23, 2021).
61. See The Readback, supra note 3.
62. Roblox Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Nov. 19, 2020); James Chen, Roblox
Chooses Direct Listing over IPO Madness, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.investopedia.
com/roblox-chooses-direct-listing-over-ipo-madness-5101253 [perma.cc/L79M-NG6P].
63. Roblox Corp., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A) (Feb. 22, 2021); Chen, supra note
62.
64. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5).
65. See id. § 77k(a).
66. See id. § 77k(b). There is an additional, judicially imposed element of these claims
called “traceability.” Essentially, the plaintiff must prove that the specific security that they own
was part of the offering associated with the registration statement containing the misstatement
or omission. Recently, the Ninth Circuit relaxed this requirement for complaints arising from
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a heightened negligence standard. 67 Underwriters are afforded an affirmative
defense (called the “due diligence defense”), allowing them to escape liability
by showing that they conducted a reasonable investigation and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the statements were true. 68 A party to an offering can
be liable under section 11 even if they do not explicitly assume the role of an
underwriter, as long as their actions come within the statutory definition of
the term. 69
D. Underwriter in Disguise?
Since the first direct listing in 2018, there has been confusion over the
applicability of section 11 to financial advisors. 70 It was certainly on the mind
of Spotify’s legal counsel—the role of financial advisors was a major subject of
a no-action letter requested by Spotify. 71 This question has also had some
scholarly inquiry, with little in the way of definitive answers. Professor Brent
Horton raises the most serious concerns. He is skeptical that financial advisors
are liable and concludes that if financial advisors are not liable, they should
have liability imposed on them to incentivize due diligence. 72 Benjamin Nickerson takes the opposite position, concluding that financial advisors in the
Spotify direct listing can almost certainly be considered underwriters. 73 Professors Anat Alon-Beck, Robert Rapp, and John Livingstone discuss the question briefly, concluding that some financial advisors could be liable without

direct listings. See Pirani v. Slack Techs., Inc., 13 F.4th 940 (9th Cir. 2021); Neal Kapoor, Direct
Listings and the Tracing Doctrine: Pirani v. Slack, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. BLOG (Mar. 14, 2022), https:
//journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/511 [perma.cc/TV9AJNYQ].
67. In Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), it was not
sufficient, for the purpose of claiming the due diligence defense, for the underwriter to elicit data
from the company; they must also verify that data to a reasonable degree. Id. at 697. In In re
WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation, 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the court articulated
that the investigation should be a “ ‘thorough’ or ‘searching inquiry,’ ” id. at 678, and should
“ ‘look deeper and question more’ where confronted with red flags” in expertized portions of the
registration statement. Id. at 677 (quoting In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235
F. Supp. 2d 549, 707 (S.D. Tex. 2002)). At the very least, it should be noted that what the court
considers to be “reasonable” is a very high degree of attention and effort on the part of the underwriter.
68. See In re WorldCom, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 662.
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2021).
70. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 5 (raising the question of underwriter liability for financial
advisors in connection to the Spotify direct listing).
71. See Spotify Tech. S.A., SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2018 WL 1531993, at *1–3 (Mar.
23, 2018) (accepting Spotify’s representation that financial advisors were not engaged to provide
any “underwriting, solicitation, or distribution services”).
72. See Horton, supra note 17, at 209–12 (concluding that financial advisors lack the incentives to serve as effective gatekeepers and that statutory liability may be necessary to incentivize them).
73. See Benjamin J. Nickerson, Comment, The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of
the Spotify Direct Listing, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 985, 1019 (2019).
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enumerating what types of involvement would trigger liability. 74 Of those that
seem to think section 11 liability is unlikely to apply, there has yet to be a clear
demonstration of why. Parts II and III of this Note aim to fill that gap by
providing a detailed analysis of financial advisors under section 11’s definition
of underwriter.
Two SEC Commissioners dissented from the approval of the 2020
amendment to NYSE rules allowing for primary direct listings. 75 In their joint
statement, they raised the issue of financial advisor liability, saying: “We understand that certain financial advisors involved in a primary direct listing
may meet the statutory definition of an underwriter . . . . However, it is currently unclear what types of involvement would result in meeting the statutory
definition.” 76 It is also notable that when Slack and Coinbase were sued under
section 11 in connection with their direct listings, the financial advisors were
not listed as defendants. 77 Given the importance of section 11 liability to investor protection, this uncertainty needs to be clarified.
II.

UNCERTAINTY AROUND FINANCIAL ADVISOR LIABILITY UNDER SECTION
11

Part II of this Note examines the precedent interpreting section 2(a)(11)
of the Securities Act. Section II.A explains the core functions common to all
underwriters and argues that they should be taken into consideration when
determining whether a party is a statutory underwriter. Section II.B discusses
the legislative history of the Securities Act. Section II.C discusses the different
judicial interpretations of section 2(a)(11) and argues in favor of the Lehman
Brothers interpretation.
A. Core Underwriter Functions: Risk and Reputation
The section 2(a)(11) definition of underwriter should be read in light of
the underwriting function that it is intended to capture. A classic underwriter

74. See Anat Alon-Beck, Robert Rapp & John Livingstone, Investment Bankers as Underwriters—Barbarians or Gatekeepers? A Response to Brent Horton on Direct Listings, 73 SMU L.
REV. F. 251, 257–58, 263 (2020) (“[D]epending on facts and circumstances, the financial adviser
in a direct listed public offering could clearly be identified as a ‘statutory underwriter.’ ”).
75. Allison Herren Lee & Caroline A. Crenshaw, Statement on Primary Direct Listings, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-crenshawlistings-2020-12-23 [perma.cc/7UWN-QVSS].
76. Id.
77. See Pirani v. Slack Techs., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 367, 372 (N.D. Cal. 2020), aff’d, 13
F.4th 940 (9th Cir. 2021); Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 15–33, Ramsey v. Coinbase Glob., Inc.,
No. 21-cv-05634 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2021); see also Slack’s Direct Listing—Court Allows Securities
Act Claims Without Requiring Tracing, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Apr. 30, 2020), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/slacks-direct-listing-court-allows-securities
-act-claims-without-requiring-tracing [perma.cc/BL66-BXXA].
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in the English system of securities distribution functioned much like an insurer. 78 These underwriters agreed to purchase “whatever portion of the issue
was not purchased by the public.” 79 The classic underwriter would necessarily
undertake a careful examination of an issuer to protect themselves but would
not necessarily market the offering. 80 The function of this arrangement was to
reallocate financial risk from the issuer to the underwriter, but it had the additional benefit of lending credibility to the issue. 81 These two functions—risk
assumption and reputation lending—are also essential to modern underwriting arrangements. 82
Firm-commitment underwriters take on the risk of financial loss when
they take title to securities and provide price stabilization services.83 Best-efforts underwriters do not take on financial risk, but they do lend their reputation when they market offerings. Specifically, they leverage their long-term
relationships with IPO market participants, such as investment banks, to
achieve high valuations for issuers. 84 Additionally, an underwriter with an exceptional reputation may increase retail investor optimism in the issuer’s future success. 85 All three methods of underwriting implicate the underwriter’s
reputation in some way; their presence lends credibility to the issuer’s offering.
The two core functions—risk shifting and credibility lending—are essential to the undertaking of underwriting. 86 While these functions are not an
explicit part of the section 2(a)(11) underwriter definition, they should be
considered when applying the definition to participants that are not clearly
underwriters. The performance of these functions is consistent with Con-

78. LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 113–14.
79. Id. at 114.
80. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
81. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
82. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 616–20 (1984).
83. See LOSS ET AL., supra note 32, at 116; see also supra text accompanying notes 29–31.
84. See Thomas J. Chemmanur & Karthik Krishnan, Heterogeneous Beliefs, IPO Valuation, and the Economic Role of the Underwriter in IPOs, 41 FIN. MGMT. 769, 770 (2012). This is
known as the “market power” hypothesis and can be contrasted with the “certification” hypothesis, which states that underwriters reduce information asymmetry by “certifying” that the issue
price is consistent with the intrinsic value of the firm. Id. at 771; see also James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith, II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON.
261 (1986).
85. Chemmanur & Krishnan, supra note 84, at 770.
86. See In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (holding that
defendants were not liable under section 11 because they did not purchase securities with intent
to distribute, offer securities on issuer’s behalf, “hold themselves out as professionals,” or “b[ear]
any risk with respect to th[e] transaction.”) (quoting McFarland v. Memorex Corp., 493 F. Supp.
631, 646 (N.D. Cal. 1980)); see also N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp.,
PLC, 720 F. Supp. 2d 254, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
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gress’s concern in drafting the Securities Act to include actors who had something to gain from a fraudulently successful issue. 87 It also echoes the House
of Representatives’ assertion that the test is one of “participation in the underwriting undertaking.” 88 A reasonable interpretation of the definition of underwriter excludes actors that do not perform these functions.
B. Legislative History
The Securities Act of 1933 was passed in response to the stock market
crash of 1929. 89 Accordingly, its primary purpose is the protection of investors. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt recommended this legislation to
Congress, he asserted that Congress has a duty to ensure that every issue of
new securities is “accompanied by full publicity and information,” but without
creating a government guarantee of any security. 90 He wanted the legislation
to “put[] the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller” and “protect the
public with the least possible interference to honest business.” 91 While the
statute had a remedial purpose, that purpose was limited. The legislative history of the Securities Act and subsequent amendments reflect a desire to balance legitimate business interests against the Act’s primary purpose to protect
investors.
In explaining the definition of an underwriter, the House of Representatives insisted that “[t]he test [was] one of participation in the underwriting
undertaking,” 92 suggesting that there should be some similarity between an
actor who is labeled as a statutory underwriter and the classic, firm-commitment or best-efforts underwriter. Namely, they should assume risk or lend
reputation in a similar way.
The extent of liability for parties other than the issuer was hotly debated
in Congress, and the liability of underwriters was ultimately limited in a 1934
amendment to the Securities Act. 93 In a letter to Congress regarding the
amendments, James Landis, who drafted the Act, explained that the definition
was intended to be broad enough to ensure that an underwriter is liable even

87. See infra Section II.B.
88. H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 24 (1933) (Conf. Rep.).
89. Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329,
337–42 (1988).
90. 77 CONG. REC. 947, 954 (1933) (statement of President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
91. Id.
92. H.R. REP. NO. 73-152, at 24 (explaining that a person is not an underwriter simply
because they furnish the underwriter with money with which they conduct a purchase of securities).
93. The Securities Act originally made underwriters potentially liable for an entire issue;
the 1934 amendment to the Act limited damages against underwriters to the “ ‘total price at
which the securities underwritten by him and distributed to the public were offered to the public.’ ” Laylin K. James, Comment, Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REV.
1130, 1136 (1934); Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 89, at 346.

December 2022]

Risk and Reputation

475

when they do not “openly and actively promote the sale of an issue.”94 This
reflects the idea that even when an actor does not actively promote for an issuer, they still have an interest in the success of the issuer, and the issuer still
gains legitimacy in the public’s view by virtue of the investment bank’s involvement. 95 Despite the lack of promotion, these underwriters “without exception, will undertake a careful examination of the terms and merits of an
issue before assuming the underwriting commitment.” 96
The legislative history of the Act reflects an intention to impose liability
on parties that actually participate in the types of activities in which an underwriter typically engages. The legislators were concerned that the presence of a
reputable bank would instill confidence in investors whether they market the
issue or not. They were also confident that, even when the underwriter’s involvement was minimal, investors would still undertake close enough examination of the issuer to identify and prevent fraud.
C. Interpretations of “Direct or Indirect Participation”
The Securities Act defines an underwriter as:
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells
for an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or
participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of
any such undertaking . . . . 97

This rather unwieldy definition can be broken down into three activities
that give rise to liability: purchasing shares for the purpose of a distribution,
offering on behalf of an issuer, or selling on behalf of an issuer. 98 An actor who
engages directly or indirectly in these three activities is an underwriter, and
their actions must take place in connection with a distribution. 99
The Supreme Court has not decided the proper interpretation of the definition of underwriter but has discussed it generally in dicta. In Pinter v. Dahl,
the Court justified a narrow interpretation of section 12(a) of the Securities
Act by comparing it to section 11. According to the Court, section 11 is the

94. 78 CONG. REC. 8714 (1934) (letter from James M. Landis, Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission); see also Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 89, at 341.
95. 78 CONG. REC. 8715 (1934).
96. Id. Landis drafted this amendment. For an analysis contemporaneous with the
amendment’s passage, see James, supra note 93.
97. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(11).
98. See In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 176 (2d Cir. 2011).
99. Id. A distribution is defined as a public offering. See Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267
F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir. 1959) (applying the standard for determining if an offering is public to
decide whether actions were taken in connection with a distribution); see also SEC v. Ralston
Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125–26 (1953) (defining a public offering by whether the offerees had
meaningful access to the kind of information found in a registration statement).
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broader provision, providing liability for “collateral participants” who participate directly or indirectly in the activities that lead to a sale. 100 Federal circuit
courts have given the definition facially different, but not irreconcilable, treatments. This Note argues that the Second Circuit’s definition in Lehman Brothers is the better interpretation.
The Seventh Circuit provides a relatively broad interpretation of the definition. In Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., the court held that a qualified independent underwriter is a statutory underwriter because “the term
‘underwriter’ is broad enough to encompass all persons who engage in steps
necessary to the distribution of securities.” 101 This interpretation, when taken
with the fact that Raffensperger, the qualified independent underwriter, never
agreed to “buy, sell, distribute, or solicit orders for the Firstmark notes,” 102 is
broad in comparison to Lehman Brothers.
The Seventh Circuit’s holding relied on the unusual role of the qualified
independent underwriter. A qualified independent underwriter was an entity
whose participation was mandated by the rules of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). 103 Qualified independent underwriters were required to participate in offerings where the issuer was a securities broker or
dealer that was self-underwriting the issue of its own securities. 104 They were
required to conduct due diligence, set the upper limit for the price of an offering, and take the full legal responsibility and liability of an underwriter. 105
The parties in Raffensperger agreed that the qualified independent underwriters did not purchase securities for the purpose of distribution, nor did
they offer or sell securities on Firstmark’s behalf. 106 The decision to hold them
liable as underwriters rested heavily on the fact that the role was created specifically by the NASD and the SEC to approximate the protective function of
an underwriter 107 by “carr[ying] out the responsibilities of a usual underwriter
in evaluating the terms of the offering.” 108 The decision was bolstered by the
fact that qualified independent underwriters voluntarily and explicitly assume
the liability usually assumed by an underwriter. 109
100. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 n.26 (1988).
101. 65 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 139 n.13
(7th Cir. 1982)).
102. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1395.
103. Id. at 1397. The NASD was a self-regulatory organization that has since been absorbed
into the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). National Association of Securities
Dealers, NASDAQ, https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/n/national-association-of-securities-dealers [perma.cc/47UL-SY55].
104. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1397; see Self-Underwriting by Nonmember Brokers or Dealers, 46 Fed. Reg. 43457 (Aug. 20, 1981).
105. Raffensperger, 65 F.3d at 1397–98.
106. Id. at 1400.
107. Id. at 1403.
108. Id. at 1402 (quoting Offerings to Public of Own Securities by Brokers and Dealers, 37
Fed. Reg. 26294, 26295 (Dec. 4, 1972)).
109. Id. at 1403.
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The preeminent case on the interpretation of the definition of “underwriter” is Lehman Brothers. 110 In that case, the Second Circuit held that credit
rating agencies were not liable as statutory underwriters. 111 The court drew a
line between participation in the distribution of securities and services that
make a distribution possible. 112 It held that “[t]he plain language of the statute
limits liability to persons who participate in the purchase, offer, or sale of securities for distribution.” 113 The court also distinguished acts that constitute
participation in those activities from acts merely necessary to the completion
of the distribution. 114 To fully understand this holding, it is helpful to understand the role of credit rating agencies in the case.
The credit rating agencies in Lehman Brothers assigned ratings to the securities at issue based on risk, a crucial step in the distribution of the securities, 115 but the rating agencies did not “ ‘participate[] in the relevant’
undertaking: that of purchasing securities from the issuer with a view towards
distribution, or selling or offering securities for the issuer in connection with
a distribution.” 116 There was also a temporal aspect to the decision: “[t]he Rating Agencies’ efforts in creating and structuring certificates occurred during
the initial stages of securitization, not during efforts to disperse certificates to
investors.”117 The court clarified that the “process of distribution” is not the
entire process of taking securities to market from inception to end, but it is
instead limited to the time when the issuer begins trying to put securities into
the hands of the public (by making and soliciting offers) and actually succeeds
in doing so (by selling and distributing securities). Participation in the process
of distribution is not sufficient if it does not constitute either direct or indirect
participation in purchasing from the issuer or selling or offering on the issuer’s behalf.
The Second Circuit had occasion to consider the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Lehman Brothers and found that it was “not as broad as [the]
plaintiffs urge[d] because the court in [Raffensperger] made clear that its inquiry was limited to the statutorily enumerated activities.” 118 When the Seventh Circuit said that the definition of underwriter “specifically covers every
110. In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 175.
112. The distribution, as defined by the Second Circuit in this case, is “the entire process
by which . . . the block of securities is dispersed and ultimately comes to rest in the hands of the
investing public.” Id. at 177 (quoting SEC v. Kern, 425 F.3d 143, 153 (2d Cir. 2005). However,
the court also uses the word “distribution” to connote the specific act of putting securities in the
hands of the public. See, e.g., id. at 183.
113. Id. at 175–76.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 171.
116. Id. at 183 (quoting In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 495, 499
(S.D.N.Y. 2010)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 179 (discussing Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1400 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
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person who participates in a distribution,” it was referring to participation in
the same acts emphasized by the Second Circuit. 119 The Second Circuit simply
made the further distinction that there are acts essential to a distribution that
do not fall within the categories of purchasing, selling, offering, or distributing, such that these acts do not create underwriter liability. The qualified
independent underwriter became a participant by virtue of their voluntary assumption of underwriter liability and their explicit purpose of acting like an
underwriter rather than by their participation in the statutorily enumerated
acts.
The Second Circuit’s definition is also consistent with Congress’s concern
about actors who are actually participating in the “underwriting undertaking.”
Those who assist with a purchase, sale, offer, or distribution actively take on
financial risk or lend their reputation. If anyone performing any act necessary
to the ultimate distribution were liable, actors who do not participate in these
core elements of the “underwriting undertaking” would also be roped in. Section 11 specifically provides for the liability of lawyers and other experts, like
accountants, engineers, and appraisers. 120 It would be redundant to include
these sections if “underwriter” encompassed any person performing an activity necessary to the distribution.
For an actor to be considered a statutory underwriter, their participation
must relate directly or indirectly to the sale, purchase, or offer of securities in
connection with a distribution. Additionally, they should lend their reputation to the issuer to some degree, and they should bear some amount of risk.
Because of its consistency with legislative history and its ability to encompass
the core underwriter functions, the Lehman Brothers interpretation should be
followed.
III. FINANCIAL ADVISOR’S LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 11
Part III of this Note applies the definition articulated in Part II to the case
of financial advisors. Section III.A argues that financial advisors’ minimal involvement in Investor Day presentations is probably insufficient to be considered indirect participation in an offer. Section III.B contends that
participation in the completion of the registration statement is likewise insufficient. Section III.C asserts that the valuation conducted by financial advisors
is insufficient because it is analogous to a credit rating. Section III.D explains
that the price discovery services of the financial advisor, while necessary to the
listing, are not sufficiently connected to selling, offering, or purchasing. Section III.E concludes and raises a normative argument for the application of
liability.

119. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F.3d 1392, 1400 (quoting SEC v. Van
Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 188 (7th Cir. 1966)).
120. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4).
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Under the Lehman Brothers interpretation, a statutory underwriter must
participate directly or indirectly in discrete sales, purchases, offers, or distribution. Normatively, their participation should either put them at financial
risk or implicate their reputation. Otherwise, they may fall outside of the intended scope of the statute. But financial advisor arrangements do not include
a risk-shifting function. Unlike the classic underwriter or the firm-commitment underwriter, financial advisors have not agreed to assume financial risk
by purchasing securities from the issuer. 121 Nor do they engage in any price
stabilization following the distribution. 122 In the absence of shouldering any
financial risk, it will be necessary to show that financial advisors meaningfully
lend credibility to the issue in a manner similar to that of a best-efforts or classic underwriter. Otherwise, the financial advisor does not perform either of
the core underwriter functions.
A. Investor Day Presentations
The activity that has the greatest potential to give rise to section 11 liability
is financial advisors’ involvement in the preparation of investor presentation
materials. Financial advisors play a role in “the preparation of investor communications and presentations in connection with investor education.” 123 Do
these educational efforts constitute direct or indirect participation in an offer?
This Section will demonstrate that they might be insufficient to render a financial advisor an underwriter. 124
The primary vehicle for investor education in direct listings has been an
“Investor Day” presentation, which takes the place of a traditional IPO roadshow. 125 It is telling that the Investor Day, and the direct listing as a whole,
lacks the book building process that is usually concomitant with a roadshow. 126 Regardless, Investor Days are closely analogous to a traditional roadshow, and roadshows are explicitly defined by the SEC as “offers.”127
Therefore, Investor Day is almost certainly an “offer.” 128

121. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
122. See id.
123. Warby Parker Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 200 (Sept. 14, 2021); see
also Slack Techs., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 171 (May 31, 2019); Coinbase
Glob., Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 208 (Mar. 23, 2021). The language is exactly
the same in each prospectus.
124. But see Nickerson, supra note 73.
125. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
127. 17 C.F.R. § 230.433(h)(4) (2021). The book building process is performed to both
market the securities and determine the issue price. It is discussed in more detail in Section I.A.
128. See, e.g., SEC v. Chinese Consol. Benevolent Ass’n, 120 F.2d 738, 739–40 (2d Cir.
1941) (holding that an advertisement in a newspaper made by persons unaffiliated with the issuer was an offer).
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However, we know that financial advisors do not participate directly in
investor meetings; therefore, they do not participate directly in that offer. 129
Purportedly, involvement is limited to the preparation of presentations. So the
question must be whether this is sufficient to constitute indirect participation
in the offer. For example, is an outsider who is retained to write and design a
newspaper advertisement indirectly participating in the solicitation of an offer?
The Supreme Court addressed a version of this question in the context of
Rule 10b-5 in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders. 130 The issue
in that case was whether Janus Capital Management LLC, which served as an
investment adviser to a mutual fund, was liable under Rule 10b-5 for material
misstatements in the mutual fund’s prospectuses. 131 The Court held that Janus
Capital Management did not “make” the statements in the prospectus because
“the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over
the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate
it.” 132 The Court reasoned that without control over these aspects of the statement, the person helping to prepare the statements “can merely suggest what
to say.” 133 So too with the preparation of presentations for Investor Day: a financial advisor does not “make” the statements about the issuer’s offering because they lack ultimate control over what the officers of the issuer say at the
presentation.
Additionally, the financial advisor is neither lending its reputation nor
assuming any risk in helping to prepare these materials. 134 Underwriters’ traditional involvement in roadshows clearly implicates their reputation, primarily through the book building process. 135 In a direct listing’s Investor Day, not
only is the financial advisor absent from the room where the offer is made and
not making any statements itself it is also not building a book. 136
A caveat to the analysis above is warranted. The question of whether one
has participated in an offer is necessarily fact specific. If a financial advisor so
much as calls potential investors and tells them about the direct listing, that
could be sufficient to render it an underwriter. 137 However, the analysis in this

129. Spotify Tech. S.A., Registration Statement (Form F-1/A), at 186 (Mar. 23, 2018).
130. 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
131. Janus, 564 U.S. at 137.
132. Id. at 142, 146.
133. Id. at 142–43 (“Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely
within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit—or
blame—for what is ultimately said.”).
134. See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text; infra notes 135–150 and accompanying text.
135. See Chemmanur & Krishnan, supra note 84, at 770.
136. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
137. Anything that conditions the market or arouses interest in a public offering could be
an offer. Interpretative Releases Relating to Securities Act of 1933 and General Rules and Regulations Thereunder, 22 Fed. Reg. 8359, 8359 (Oct. 4, 1957).
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Part focuses on the actions that financial advisors purport to take, not those
that they may take illicitly behind the scenes.
If the financial advisor is not present at the meeting where an offer is
made, and the statements that constitute the offer cannot be attributed to the
advisor, it is difficult to see how it is a participant in that offer. As is the case
with a speechwriter, the public neither attributes the statements to the financial advisor nor believes that it is endorsing those statements. As such, the
preparation of materials for an Investor Day presentation is not sufficient to
constitute direct or indirect participation.
B. Registration Statements
Relatedly, financial advisors assist the issuer in completing the registration statement that is filed with the SEC. 138 The registration process itself is
distinct from any sale, purchase, or offer of securities. 139 One might argue that
participation in registration should be considered participation in an offer,
but this will run into the same problems that were encountered in reference
to investor education. 140 The financial advisor does not have ultimate control
over what goes in the registration statement, 141 and so they are not the maker
of the statement. 142 Under section 11, some people who participate in the
preparation of a registration statement can be held liable on the basis of that
participation—namely, those who consent to be named as experts. 143 However, the fact that section 11 requires experts to consent to be named for their
participation in the registration process to create liability implies that participation is not enough. It must be the kind of participation that lends legitimacy
to the registration. 144 This was on display in Refco, where the Second Circuit
decided that a defendant that participated only in the registration process was
not liable as an underwriter. 145 Participation in the registration process is
probably insufficient on its own to create section 11 liability for financial advisors.

138. Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
139. See In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2011);
In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
140. See supra notes 123–126 and accompanying discussion.
141. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
142. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying discussion.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4).
144. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386 n.22 (1983) (explaining that
there are participants in the registration process that cannot be held liable under section 11).
145. In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 611, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Refco, Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 8626, 2008 WL 3843343, at *1, *3–5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2008).
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C. Valuation
The financial advisor also assists with the valuation of the company, a prerequisite for listing on an exchange. 146 To qualify for a direct listing, the company must submit a valuation in excess of $250 million to the exchange. 147
This step is obviously necessary, but as the Second Circuit held, the necessity
of an activity is not sufficient to create section 11 liability. 148 The activity must
constitute participation, directly or indirectly, in purchasing, selling, offering,
or distributing. 149
At the valuation stage, the financial advisor does not make any offers or
sales, nor does the issuer. 150 The issuer simply seeks to prove to the exchange
that it meets the requirements for listing. It is an exchange requirement rather
than a market expectation. The fact that an issuer has met an exchange’s listing
requirements cannot be taken as an endorsement of its securities’ quality; no
one assumes that securities are a good investment simply because their issuer
has qualified to trade them on an exchange. While this step is essential to the
listing, it lacks the necessary connection to purchasing, selling, offering, or
distributing. The role of a financial advisor, therefore, is sufficiently analogous
to the role of credit rating agencies to conclude that it does not give rise to
section 11 liability. 151
D. Price Setting in Consultation with the Designated Market Maker
Financial advisors are also required by the exchange to assist the designated market maker (DMM) in setting the price of the listing. 152 Financial advisors in direct listings have significantly less control over the price of the
listing than do either firm-commitment or best-efforts underwriters. 153 The
opening price is determined by buy and sell orders collected by NYSE from
broker-dealers and the DMM’s determination of where buy orders can be
matched with sell orders at a single price. 154 The financial advisor is responsible for consulting with the DMM on the price without input from the issuer. 155

146. Horton, supra note 17, at 195; NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 39, at
§ 102.01B.
147. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 39, at § 102.01B.
148. In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Sec. Litig., 650 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2011).
149. Id. at 177.
150. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
151. See supra Section II.C.
152. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
153. Firm-commitment underwriters set the price of an issue through the process of book
building. GEDDES, supra note 24, at 70. In best-efforts arrangements, the price is negotiated by
the issuer and the underwriter. Id. at 69.
154. Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
155. Id.
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However, the DMM is free to disregard their advice, and the price is based
significantly on orders received by the DMM. 156
Like the valuation, this step is necessary for the distribution, but it lacks
the requisite connection to purchasing, selling, offering, or distributing. While
it is temporally closer to the actual sale than valuation, price setting is simply
not a sale. 157 When the financial advisor provides advice to the DMM, no securities have yet changed hands. 158 Additionally, it seems that if this were to
create liability, such liability would have to extend to the DMM as well.
Unlike price discovery in a firm-commitment or best-efforts arrangement, the financial advisor’s reputation is not implicated in the price-setting
process. Their lack of control makes it very unlikely that their participation in
the price-setting process will foster confidence or doubt in the final price determination. Unlike a best-efforts underwriter, the financial advisor does not
market the sale of securities at the price, further reducing both the incentive
to achieve a correct price and the public’s ability to rely on the financial advisor’s participation for comfort.
E. Should Financial Advisors Be Liable?
The evaluation of these discrete acts displays the absence of core underwriter functions, making it difficult to conclude that they should be statutory
underwriters. The services that financial advisors provide are unlikely to qualify them as underwriters because such services typically fall outside of the categories of selling, offering, purchasing, or distributing. 159 Investment banks
acting as financial advisors do not conduct a roadshow, build a book of interested investors, or market the issue to the public. Therefore, it is unlikely that
investment banks acting as financial advisors in direct listings are liable under
section 11 as statutory underwriters.
Their reputations are not put on the line, and they bear no financial risk.
Unlike the classic underwriter, it does not appear that any of the services provided by financial advisors display a level of confidence in the issue that would
lend credibility. The absence of the core underwriter functions makes it difficult to argue that financial advisors are engaged in the “underwriter undertaking” 160 and implies that they should fall outside of the scope of actors that
Congress intended to regulate through the underwriter definition. When
taken with the foregoing analysis, this suggests that financial advisors should
not be held liable as underwriters.

156. See id.
157. See Securities Act of 1933 § 2(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (defining “sale” as the exchange
of the security for value).
158. See Jaffe et al., supra note 44.
159. See In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d, 611, 629–30 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
160. See supra note 88.

484

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 121:461

IV. PULLED IN TWO DIRECTIONS
Part IV of this Note examines the implications of the conclusion that financial advisors cannot be held liable as underwriters. Section IV.A discusses
the concerns it raises for investor protection and introduces the concept of
gatekeeper liability. Section IV.B applies a framework developed by Professor
Assaf Hamdani to explain why imposing negligence-based liability on financial advisors could undermine the primary benefit of direct listing and instead
suggests a direct regulation approach.
Financial advisors are unlikely to be liable as underwriters under section
11. Their activities lack the requisite connection to purchasing, selling, offering, or distributing securities. Core underwriter functions—risk shifting and
reputation lending—are likewise absent. Even though financial advisors do
not serve the role of an underwriter, should they be tagged with liability anyway?
A missing underwriter is a missing gatekeeper. Underwriters are in a position to identify fraud, and they are strongly incentivized to stop it because of
their exposure to liability. There is a concern that without liability under section 11, the most rigorous antifraud statute, a financial advisor will be unable
to perform the gatekeeping role of an underwriter. However, the financial advisor is still subject to scienter-based liability under Rule 10b-5. 161 This observation allows us to reframe the discussion of financial advisor liability as a
discussion about what level of liability is acceptable. Should we accept scienter-based liability for financial advisors, or should we insist on increasing it to
a negligence standard? This Part assumes that there is a need to incentivize
financial advisors to be effective gatekeepers but argues that negligence-based
liability may be too costly a way to achieve it.
A. Investor Protection Concerns
Securities law is largely concerned with ensuring that the investing public
has access to complete and reliable information about companies before investing in them. 162 Accordingly, the civil liability provisions of the Securities
Act punish actors who intentionally or unintentionally shirk their duty to disclose complete and reliable information. 163 Section 11 liability provides investors with a remedy for misinformation and omissions in an issuer’s
registration statement. 164 That liability extends to other parties that participated in the offering—officers of the issuer, underwriters, and experts. 165 In
doing so, the law recognizes that material misstatements and omissions can

161.
(1976).
162.
163.
164.
165.

See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193
CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 22.
See id. at 570.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a).
Id.
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cause damage to investors through their impact on the market price of the
security. 166
The inapplicability of section 11 to financial advisors means one less defendant in section 11 cases and one less party from which an investor could
potentially recover. Although investors may not succeed in their section 11
claims against financial advisors, they will still have the opportunity to bring
these claims against the issuer, officers of the issuer that signed the registration
statement, the issuer’s directors, and experts that consented to be named on
the registration statement. 167 The liability of these parties is joint and several:
the plaintiff can recover from any one of the defendants, and the defendants
may recover contributions from each other after the fact. 168 It is therefore possible that an investor could fully recover without including the financial advisor in the litigation. The risk of an investor not fully recovering is greatest if
an issuer is insolvent. Without the ability to include the investment bank, the
investor may be able to recover only a portion of what is owed to them.
A greater concern than finding someone to sue is the absence of a gatekeeper. A gatekeeper is a secondary actor who has been enlisted by Congress
and the SEC to provide some degree of oversight. 169 Gatekeepers are incentivized—either through liability or regulatory mandates—to use their expertise
and access to information to prevent fraud. 170 Underwriters are incentivized
to act as gatekeepers by the threat of section 11 liability. The absence of this
liability raises the concern that financial advisors do not have an adequate incentive to act as effective gatekeepers. 171
One proposed solution is to alter stock exchange requirements to require
financial advisors to consent to the legal duties and liabilities of an underwriter. 172 This solution draws on the qualified independent underwriter. Recall from Harden v. Raffensperger, the qualified independent underwriter was
a particular entity created by the NASD and the SEC to approximate the function of an underwriter. 173 This strategy would have stock exchanges require
financial advisors to voluntarily assume section 11 liability.
Section 11 is not the only way to hold a gatekeeper liable. Rule 10b-5 allows plaintiffs to sue anyone committing fraud through an exchange. 174 While
166. John R. Allison, Comment, Section 11 of the Securities Act—A Proposal for Allocating
Liability, 45 WASH. L. REV. 95, 105 (1970).
167. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a)(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)–(5).
168. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f)(1).
169. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 938.
170. For a clear overview of the concept of gatekeeper liability, see Reinier H. Kraakman,
Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. L., ECON. & ORG. 53
(1986). For a critical examination of the efficacy of gatekeeper liability regimes and suggested
alternatives, see Peter J. Henning, The New Corporate Gatekeeper, 62 WAYNE L. REV. 29 (2016)
and Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916 (1998).
171. Horton, supra note 17, at 210–12.
172. Id. at 212.
173. See supra Section II.C.
174. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021).
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section 11 affords a negligence-based “due diligence” defense to underwriters, 175 Rule 10b-5 requires a showing of scienter on the part of the defendant. 176 Scienter is defined as an intent to deceive, but it has also been
interpreted to include severe recklessness. 177 Imposing section 11 liability on
financial advisors is fairly characterized as a move from scienter-based liability
to negligence-based liability. Increasing liability would increase the incentive
of financial advisors to be effective gatekeepers but also imposes a cost on the
market. Given that cost, is the incentive imposed by Rule 10b-5’s scienterbased liability sufficient?
B. Weighing the Cost of Increased Liability
Increasing liability from scienter to negligence carries a cost. 178 Under
negligence-based liability, gatekeepers will compensate for the risk by increasing fees. 179 When a gatekeeper is unable to reliably distinguish between clients
with bad intentions and those with lawful intentions, its fees will not reflect
the actual probability of wrongdoing for each particular client. 180 The gatekeeper will instead opt to charge a uniform risk premium to all of its clients
“based on the average likelihood of wrongdoing that characterizes the relevant
population of prospective clients.” 181 Increased fees can discourage law-abiding clients from entering the market unless the latent benefits of entering the
market are sufficiently enticing. 182
These assertions about the effect of increased liability are especially salient
for direct listings because their primary benefits derive from their low cost.
The absence of an underwriter is the primary source of the cost-saving benefit.
Professor Hamdani’s framework suggests that increasing liability could increase the cost imposed by financial advisors, diluting the cost-saving benefit.
If the cost increases to the degree that it outweighs the latent benefits—
namely, the option to conduct a secondary offering later on—then the dilution
would be even greater.
If we found direct listings to be abhorrently dangerous, then it would be
fine to discourage their use. But that is not the case. Instead, direct listings

175. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2021); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
177. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Edward J. Goodman Life Income Tr.
v. Jabil Cir., Inc., 594 F.3d 783, 790 (11th Cir. 2010).
178. Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 103–04 (2003).
179. Id. Professor Hamdani concludes that as liability regimes move from negligence to
strict liability, there is an increase in cost resulting from the distortion of market-entry decisions
caused by information asymmetry. Id. at 72–74, 103. Professor Hamdani suggests three potential
adverse consequences when strict liability is applied to gatekeepers: market unraveling, the departure of law-abiding clients from the market, and the possibility of no deterrent effect. Id. at
74.
180. Id. at 73.
181. Id.
182. See id.
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come with many benefits. Companies benefit because direct listings are quick,
efficient, and cost-effective. 183 And it creates liquidity for selling shareholders,
which potentially increases selling-shareholder returns. 184
Investors also stand to gain from direct listings. The bar for entry to the
direct listing market is high; a company must show a valuation of $250 million
to qualify for an NYSE direct listing. 185 This mechanism could filter out lowperforming companies. 186 There is a potential risk-shifting mechanism as well:
the company is funded in its earlier and riskier stages by venture capital firms
and is only taken public as a mature company. 187
Exactly how much cost increased liability would impose on the direct listing market is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Note. Still, if increasing liability on financial advisors could dilute the benefits of direct
listings, should we be content with the scienter-based Rule 10b-5? Professor
Hamdani suggests that we should not. 188 Scienter-based liability will only
make financial advisors liable when they know about wrongdoing, meaning
they have “no incentives to scrutinize client conduct even when detecting misconduct is relatively easy.” 189 However, the fact that the primary benefit of this
process is its cost savings should give policymakers a reason to consider other
methods for enlisting financial advisors as gatekeepers.
When gatekeeper liability is overly costly, as it may be in the case of financial advisors, government regulation can step in to provide incentives.
Professor Hamdani’s research suggests that when negligence-based regimes
are overly costly, they can be supplemented with direct regulation—rules requiring or forbidding certain discrete actions—to incentivize gatekeepers
while keeping costs low. 190 The SEC has the capacity to set specific standards
for market participants, as they have with attorneys and auditors. 191 If the primary concern is that financial advisors will not scrutinize client conduct, the
SEC could promulgate rules requiring financial advisors or another entity to
do so. 192 There should be some attempt made to both protect investors and
maintain the benefits of direct listings, and Hamdani’s framework suggests
that direct regulation could be the way.
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CONCLUSION
It is tempting to think of the financial advisor’s role as an adaptation of
the traditional underwriter’s role, especially because the same actor performs
both functions. But that is not enough to attach section 11 liability. Rather
than imposing section 11 liability on financial advisors at the expense of the
benefits of the innovation, the SEC should create rules that require financial
advisors, or some other entity, to closely scrutinize issuer information. In the
meantime, the SEC should dispel uncertainty by providing guidance based on
the analysis in Part III of this Note. It should instruct investors, issuers, and
financial advisors that direct communication with investors as part of Investor
Day, attendance of Investor Day events, or promotion of Investor Day events
will likely be considered participation in an offer for the purposes of section
2(a)(11) of the Securities Act.
Securities regulation is a balancing act between the protection of investors
and the legitimate interests of businesses. Direct listing is no different. It offers
new benefits to investors and issuers, and it offers new dangers. In adapting
to this development, the SEC should seek to maximize investor protections to
the extent that it retains the benefits of the method.

